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WEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL LOSSES SOLUTION
JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
Abstract. We propose and characterize a new solution for problems with asym-
metric bargaining power among the agents that we named weighted proportional
losses solution. It is specially interesting when agents are bargaining under re-
stricted probabilistic uncertainty. The weighted proportional losses assigns to
each agent losses proportional to her ideal utility and also proportional to her
bargaining power. This solution is always individually rational, even for 3 or more
agents and it can be seen as the normalized weighted equal losses solution. When
bargaining power among the agents is equal, the weighted proportional losses so-
lution becomes the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We characterize our solution in
the basis of restricted monotonicity and restricted concavity. A consequence of
this result is an alternative characterization of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which
includes contexts with some kind of uncertainty. Finally we show that weighted
proportional losses solution satis￿es desirable properties as are strong Pareto op-
timality for 2 agents and continuity also ful￿lled by Kalai-Smorodinsky solution,
that are not satis￿ed either by weighted or asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tions.
Introduction
In his seminal paper, Nash (1950)[13] de￿ned a bargaining solution as a function
that produces, for each problem in the class, an alternative in that problem. Nash’s
objective was to develop a theory that would help to predict the compromise the
agents would reach. He characterized a solution, now called the Nash solution, and
showed that this solution is the only that satis￿es a certain list of axioms. Nash
limited his attention to the two-person case but his solution, and his characteriza-
tion,can easily be extended to the n-person case.
A central axiom in Nash’s characterization is Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives axiom, which says that whether a point is the solution, all contractions of the
set will not a￿ect the solution provided this point remains feasible. This axiom has
been criticized in the subsequent years.
Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975, [10] proposed a new axiom, the Individual Mono-
tonicity, which says that whether the feasible set enlarges, the utilities of all agents
should improve or at least should not be smaller. These authors felt that Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives was not fully justi￿ed and, in their opinion, if the
alternatives to the solution for one agent are worse than the alternatives of the other
agent, this should pro￿t of this situation. This means that the alternatives that the
agents have if the set enlarges matters to reach an agreement.
Other solutions proposed after Nash are: the Egalitarian solution (Kalai 1977b[9]),
that is the maximal point in the set of equal coordinates; Dictatorial solutions,
that is the maximal point of the set with the maximal "dictator agent" coordinate;
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the Perles-Maschler solution (Perles and Maschler in 1981[14]) by means of super-
additivity axiom, this axiom means that the solution of the sum of the sets is equal
or greater than the sum of the solutions of each set. This property is very close to set
concavity axiom, which says that if the feasible set is uncertain, the agents would
prefer to reach an agreement before uncertainty is resolved; Utilitarian solution,
that is the maximization of the sum of all utilities and Equal losses solution, that
means the point on the Pareto frontier where all agents make the same concessions.
In the literature are re￿ected some approaches that analyze asymmetric bargain-
ing problems, that is, bargaining situations where the bargaining power is not the
same among the agents; the ￿rst contribution is Kalai (1977a)[8] with the Nonsym-
metric Nash Solution, that arise from symmetric Nash solution through replications.
In this work Kalai shows that this replications do not work for the case of mono-
tonic solutions because after replications the replicated monotonic solutions keep
the symmetric property.
Kalai (1977b) [9] proposes the Proportional solution as an asymmetric Egalitarian
solution (E), we will illustrate the solution in the ￿gure 1.
There exist two versions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS) that can re￿ect
asymmetries in the bargaining power that agents have (or other di￿erence among
agents expressed in relative terms). The ￿rst, Weighted KS solution (KS), was
introduced by Thomson (1994)[21] and consists in an asymmetric one parameter
function that generalizes the KS solution. The second, Asymmetric KS solution
was introduced by Dubra (2001)[4] and consists in a lexicographic extension of the
weighted KS solution (lKS).
There have been several attempts in the literature to characterize asymmetric
solutions by means of a reference point, which could in some cases be endogenous and
in other cases exogenous. There exist two approaches in this way, solutions de￿ned by
the maximal point in the set on a straight line passing though the disagreement point
and the reference point; and solutions de￿ned by the maximal point in the set on
the straight line that connect the reference point with the utopia point. Salonen[18]
shows a solution on the straight line that connect the disagreement point with a
endogenous reference point and Salonen[19] shows a new solution on the straight line
that connect the same endogenous reference point with the utopia point. Gupta and
Livne[6] show a solution on the straight line that connect a exogenous reference point
with the utopia point and Gupta[5] shows a solution for multiple issue bargaining
using an endogenous reference point. Anbarci[1] shows the concept of gravity center
as a endogenous reference point and later de￿ne two concepts of solutions, one on
the straight line that connect the disagreement point with the gravity center and
another on the straight line that connect the gravity center with the utopia point.
Anbarci and Bigelow (1994)[2] characterize a new solution is the point in the Pareto
frontier when the line through the disagreement point, d, divides S+ into two subsets
of equal area. All these solutions depends critically of the shape’s set, and this is
the reason why they do not satisfy any property that deal with uncertainty, except
for the solution of Gupta and Livne [6], but this has a exogenous reference point
and furthermore assume by means of Limited Sensitivity to Changes in the Con￿ict
Point axiom that if the con￿ict situation changes, the sole change being in the
con￿ict point, and if the change induces no change in the ideal point, then the
solution does not change.
We propose a new solution for asymmetric bargaining problems by means of
mutual concession among the agents concept using an endogenous reference point.WEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL LOSSES SOLUTION 3
We also introduce two new axioms, one that we use for characterizing our solution
in 2-person bargaining situations and other that we introduce in the context of n-
person bargaining situations.
The ￿rst, which is call restricted concavity, is a straightforward transformation
of concavity axiom proposed by Myerson (1981). Restricted concavity is a weaker
condition than the usual version and also is related with the bargaining under one
way of probabilistic uncertainty. This axiom says that if bargaining take place now
but the feasible set will be known only later, but the utopia point of all possible
sets are the same, it would be preferable for the agents to reach a compromise now
instead of waiting until the uncertainty is resolved. The second axiom is called
utopia continuity, it says that if a sequence of sets tend to the utopia point (free
con￿ict point), the solutions of each set it should also tend to the utopia point.
Section I introduces notation and the main de￿nitions, section II shows our solu-
tion concept and its characterization for 2 agents, section III extends the result for
n  3 agents providing also its characterization and, ￿nally, section IV summarizes
the main highlights and conclusions.
1. Definitions and Notations
The following notation is used. Let x;y 2 R2, y  x; y1  x1 and y2  x2; y = x
if y1 > x1 and y2 > x2 or y1 = x1 and y2 = x2; y > x if y  x and y 6= x; y  x if
y1 > x1 and y2 > x2.
We consider the classical bargaining problem introduced by Nash. (For a survey
see Thomson (1994) [21]). A subset S  R2 called feasible set if it is convex,
compact and comprehensive (for each x 2 S and each y 2 R2, such that if y  x,
then y 2 S). The convex comprehensive hull of a set S  R2, cch(S), is the
smallest convex and comprehensive set containing S. The disagreement point, d,
is the outcome that the agents get if they do not reach an agreement. Furthermore
d 2 S and a set S is non-degenerate if x 2 S such that x  d.
A bargaining problem is a pair (S;d), when S is a feasible set and d is the
disagreement point.
Let  the set of bargaining problems. A solution is a function f :  ! R2
such that, for each (S;d) 2 , f(S;d) 2 S . The point f(S;d) is the solution point
of (S;d).
Without loss of generality we consider the domain 0 (problems whose disagree-
ment point is zero). For problems with disagreement di￿erent of zero, d, we
can make this transformation. By translation invariance (which says that the
addition of constants to utility functions should be accompanied by the corre-
sponding translation of the solution outcome), if S 2 d, then S0 = S   fdg =
fx 2 Rnjx = s   d;s 2 Sg 2 0. For simplicity, we write S instead of (S;d).
The set of individually rational points of S is de￿ned as S+ = S \ R2
+. Given
S and d = 0, we restrict our attention to sets contained in R2
+, we omit for simplicity
the subscript +. For a given S, the point m(S) is the utopia point, where mi(S)
de￿nes the maximum outcome for the player i on the set S.
The strong Pareto frontier of S is the set SPO(S)  fx 2 Sjif y > x then y = 2 Sg
and the weak Pareto frontier is the set WPO(S)  fx 2 Sjif y  x then y = 2Sg.
It is widely accepted in the literature that every solution should satisfy at least
the following axioms that give to the solution desirable properties: Pareto optimal-
ity, translation invariance and individual rationality. We already introduced Pareto
optimality and translation invariance. Individual rationality says that at the solu-
tion outcome, all agents’ payo￿s should be at least as large as at d. The classic4 JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
bargaining solutions consider that all agents have the same bargaining power, un-
der this assumption, this solutions often satisfy symmetry, which says that for each
fi;jg;fi(S) = fj(S).
Nash (1950) required that solution satis￿ed independence of irrelevant alter-
natives: if S  T and f(T) 2 S, then f(S) = f(T). The Nash solution is the only
one that satis￿es Pareto optimality, translation invariance , symmetry, individual
rationality and independence of irrelevant alternatives axioms (Nash 1950 [13]).
To re￿ect relative di￿erences among each agent i, we de￿ne a parameter ;





i=1 i = 1
	
. The Nash solution expression that consider
asymmetry in the bargaining problems in the class 0 is de￿ned by:
The weighted Nash solution with weights  2 n 1 is de￿ned by setting, for





When i = 1
n, N is the standard Nash solution.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution assigns to each S 2  the unique maximal ele-
ment in L(0;m(S)) \ S, where  is the set of all convex and comprehensive sets;
mi(S) = maxfxijx 2 WPOg, for each i 2 f1;2g; and L(x;y) is the line passing
though x;y 2 R2. Individual monotonicity axiom, which says that if S  T and
mj(S) = mj(T) for each j 6= i; then fi(S) 5 fi(T). The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
is the only solution that satis￿es weak Pareto optimality, translation invariance,
symmetry,individual rationality and individual monotonicity (Kalai-Smorodinsky
1975[10])
Strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity characterize a large fam-
ily of solutions that de￿ne all monotonic solutions that connect the disagreement
point with utopia point (Peters and Tijs 1985b[15]). If two bargaining pairs have
the same disagreement point and utopia point, and if the set of feasible utility pairs
in the ￿rst problem contains that of the second problem, then in the ￿rst problem
an individually monotonic solution assigns larger utilities to the players than in
the second one. Restricted monotonicity was used to emphasize the importance of
comprehensiveness, since if this assumption is not imposed, weak Pareto optimality,
symmetry and restricted monotonicity are incompatible ( Roth 1979 [17]).
To accommodate asymmetries in the bargaining power of the agents, Thomson
(1994)[21] generalizes the KS solution as follows:
The weighted Kalai-Smorodinky solution with weights  2 int fn 1g is












This weighted Kalai-Smorodinky solution can be interpreted as a weighted pro-
portional gains solution, in the sense that the solution is proportional to the utopia
point of each agent considering a weight or asymmetry  among the agents.
Dubra (2001)[4] points out that Thomson’s solution is not strong Pareto optimal
for all possible sets in the bargaining domain. Hence, using a lexicographic extension
of KS, he de￿nes a new one parameter asymmetric solution that satis￿es SPO and
that he call asymmetric KS solution.
The asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinky solution with weights  2 intfn 1g is
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A limitation of this solution is that it does not satisfy continuity, and this feature
is not in the line of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. This solution proposed by Dubra is
strong Pareto optimal at a cost of losing continuity. In the next section we propose
a new solution that considers asymmetries in the bargaining power of the agents and
yield an strong Pareto optimal solution maintaining continuity, being KS solution a
special symmetric case.
The equal losses solution equalize across the agents the losses from the ideal
point (Chun 1988 [3]). This equal losses solution does not satisfy individual ra-
tionality for n  3 players, since the line that intersect the set starting from the
utopia point could not ￿nd the set depending of the shape of this set. We adapt the
equal losses in a weighted version as follow:
The weighted losses solution with weights  2 n 1 is de￿ned by setting,
for each S 2 0:
(1.4) EL
(S) = argmaxfx 2 Sjm1(S)   x1 = m2   (1   )x2g:
This weighted Losses solution does not satisfy individual rationality when n  3
agents, but for 2-person bargaining problems it does.
There is a rational equal-losses that ensures individual rationality (Herrero and
Marco 1993[7]). As we can see later, lexicographical solutions can not deal with any
kind of probabilistic uncertainty.
d
S
m(S) Eα α α α KSα α α α lKSα α α α
Nα α α α
KS
ELα α α α
α α α α m m m m1 1 1 1
(1 (1 (1 (1       α α α α)m )m )m )m2 2 2 2
Figure 1. Solutions for 2 agents bargaining problem6 JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
2. New Solution and Characterization
In the line of mutual concessions philosophy, we propose a new solution for asym-
metric bargaining problems that we name weighted proportional losses solution.
In ￿gure 2 is this weighted proportional losses solution graphically represented.
Let m(S) the utopia point and edr(S) the endogenous reference point given by
(m1(S);(1   )m2(S)).
De￿nition 1. The weighted proportional losses solution with weights  2 n 1
is de￿ned by setting, for each S 2 0:
(2.1) PL
(S) = argmaxfx 2 Sjx = (1   )edr(S) + m(S)g:
This point is yielded by the distribution of bargaining power on the smallest
convex and comprehensive set given an utopia point. In terms of losses, we can








(1   )(m2(S)   x2)
m2(S)

It is a normalized version of weighted losses solution, in the sense that the solution
outcome is proportional to the utopia point of the bargaining set and for this reason
the solution also satis￿es scale invariance axiom. We provide a characterization
for n  3 that does not involve this axiom, but note that the property is still
satis￿ed by PL. This happen because for n = 2, this generalization of the equal
losses solution (weighted losses solution) and also the symmetric case (equal losses
solution), are individually rational and therefore we need to include scale invariance
in the characterization to achieve uniqueness in the proof of the theorem 1. In
contrast, with n  3, those solutions do not satisfy individual rationality, then we
do not need add scale invariance in the characterization to get uniqueness.WEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL LOSSES SOLUTION 7
d = (0, 0)
S
m(S)= ( m(S)= ( m(S)= ( m(S)= (m m m m1 1 1 1, m , m , m , m2 2 2 2) ) ) )
PLα α α α
α α α α m m m m1 1 1 1
(1 (1 (1 (1       α α α α)m )m )m )m2 2 2 2
( ( ( (α α α α m m m m1 1 1 1, (1 , (1 , (1 , (1       α α α α)m )m )m )m2 2 2 2) ) ) )
Figure 2. The weighted proportional losses solution for 2 agents bar-
gaining problem
 We will see later that PL solution outcome satis￿es SPO for n = 2 agents and
not for n  3 as is the case for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We state formally
the axiom of SPO:
Strong Pareto Optimality: For every S 2 0, then f(S) 2 SPO(S).
Strong Pareto optimality axiom implies e￿ciency, it means that a solution will be
in the frontier of the set that is a attainable point where none of the agents can
improve their utility without a loss of utility for the other agent.
 Other well known axiom deal with the possibility that the bargaining set could
be normalized by means of a positive a￿ne transformation. This axiom is scale
invariance; formally:
Scale Invariance: For each S 2 0, f(S) = f(S).
Scale invariance was introduced by Nash (1950)[13] and is one of the four axioms
that characterize Nash solution. When one solution satis￿es scale invariance, the
bargaining set can be normalized in another with disagreement f0g and utopia
point f1g, and the solution on this set is in relative terms equivalent to the solution
outcome in the original set. In other words, it does no matter if agents change
the scale of units in which they are bargaining. Hence scale invariance implies
interpersonal comparison of utility, thing that usually can be observed when agents
try to reach compromises.8 JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
 The concept of monotonicity is very clear in bargaining situations, since is very
convincing to argue that if the feasible set increases, the payo￿ of any agent should
not decrease. In this kind of axioms we have:
Restricted Monotonicity: For each pair S;T 2 0, if S  T and m(S) =
m(T); then f(S)  f(T).
Restricted monotonicity is weaker than individual monotonicity used by Kalai and
Smorodinsky that was introduced by Rosenthal (1976)[16]. This axiom means that
an expansion of the feasible set leaving una￿ected the utopia point bene￿ts all
agents.
Peters and Tijs (1985) [15] characterize the big family of all individually mono-
tonic bargaining solution by means of scale invariance, strong Pareto optimality and
restricted monotonicity.
 We are also interested in contexts with uncertainty, there exist in the literature
several kinds of uncertainty, for example probabilistic and non probabilistic. We
focus in probabilistic uncertainty, that is, when we can relate each event with a
probability that this event happen. Myerson(1981)[12] introduced set concavity
axiom, which meaning is closely related with the fact to be bargaining under prob-
abilistic uncertainty; when this axiom is satis￿ed, the agents are willing to reach an
agreement before to know the set because all them bene￿t from this early agreement
(see Thomson’s survey[21]).
In this context, as well as KS solution, we are interested in properties that remain
una￿ected for a given utopia point and, as in the case of monotonicity, we introduce a
straightforward transformation of concavity axiom that is a weaker condition
than usual version and it is related with the concept of probabilistic uncertainty for
sets with the same utopia point, therefore, this axioms is desirable when the agents
are bargaining under restricted probabilistic uncertainty. The PL it also
satis￿es proportional concavity, that is, if there exist changes in all utopia points
but they are in the same proportion, PL still maintain the concavity property.
Restricted Concavity: For each  2 [0;1] and for each pair S;T 2 0, such
that m(S) = m(T), f(S + (1   )T) = f(S) + (1   )f(T).
Restricted concavity axiom means that if bargaining take place now but the feasible
set will be known only later, and we know the utopia point of all possible sets are
the same, it would be preferable for the agents to reach a compromise now instead
of speculate waiting the resulting set. A necessary condition for this is that both
bene￿t from early agreement.
Now we are in position to state our main result in the next theorem:
Theorem 1. For n = 2, a solution satis￿es strong Pareto optimality, scale invari-
ance, restricted monotonicity, and restricted concavity, if and only if is a weighted
proportional losses solution.
Proof. Step 1. Let  2 n. We show that PL satis￿es the axioms of the theorem.
We show that PL is an individually monotonic bargaining solution as de￿ned
Peters and Tijs (1985)[15]: Let r = conv f(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g. Let  : [1;2] ! r
and  2 [1;2], then () = (2   )(;1   ) + (   1)(1;1) is a map satisfying
the property that Peters and Tijs (1985)[15] called (C). Let  be the family of
maps satisfying (C), then PL 2 . By Peters and Tijs (1985)[15] proportional
losses solution is an individual monotonic solution and then satis￿es strong Pareto
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 PL also satis￿es restricted concavity: Let S;T 2 0 and C(S;T;)  (S +
(1   )T). We know that PL(S) + (1   )PL(T) 2 C(S;T;) and PL(S +
(1   )T) 2 C(S;T;). By restricted concavity, PL(S + (1   )T) = PL(S) +
(1   )PL(T). Suppose by contradiction that PL(S + (1   )T) < PL(S) +
(1   )PL(T). By de￿nition of the weighted proportional losses, if x 2 S, there is
no y 2 S such that y > x. Thus, if PL(S) + (1   )PL(T) 2 C(S;T;), then
PL(S + (1   )T;)  PL(S) + (1   )PL(T).
Step 2. We prove uniqueness.
 Let a solution f satisfying strong Pareto optimality, scale invariance, restricted
monotonicity and restricted concavity. By Peters and Tijs (1985)[15], f is an indi-
vidually monotonic solution, then there is a monotonic curve  : [1;2] ! r that
connect the disagreement point with the utopia point. We prove that  is a line.
Let S 2 0 with m(S) = (1;1), f(S) is the intersection among the strong Pareto
boundary of S and  curve, then there is t 2 [1;2] such that f(S) = (t).
Let Vt = conv f(0;0);(1;0);(1;t   1);(t   1;1);(0;1)g, then f(Vt) = f(S) = (t).
Let  2 [0;1], since f is restricted concavity, f(cch(Vt)+(1 )Vt) = f(cch(Vt))+
(1   )f(Vt). By the de￿nition of Vt, f(cch(Vt) + (1   )Vt) = f(cch(Vt)) +
(1   )f(Vt). This implies that  is a line that connect f(cch(Vt)) and f(Vt). Let
2  s  t  1, let Vs = conv f(0;0);(1;0);(1;s   1);(s   1;1);(0;1)g, analogously
Vt we prove that for s < 1, the curve between f(Vs) and f(cch(Vs)) is a line. 
A special case occurs when i = 1
n that yield a particular outcome of weighted
proportional losses solution, if the agents have the same bargaining power, the so-
lution becomes symmetric and then weighted proportional losses solution becomes
Kalai-Smoradinsky solution.
 There exist a weaker axiom than symmetry to re￿ect this fact, it is midpoint
domination. (Moulin (1983) [11]; also see Thomson (1994)[21], Sect 4.1). It says
that for each problem, each agent’s payo￿ should be at least as large as the average
of its dictatorial outcomes. This average can be interpreted as an equal-probability
lottery over these outcomes. Midpoint domination is formally de￿ned in the R2
domain as follow.
Midpoint Domination: For each S 2 0, f(S) = [
P2
i=1 fDi(S)]=2 where
fDi(S) is the dictatorial not lexicographic solution for player i
The next corollary shows an alternative characterization of Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in terms of restricted probabilistic uncertainty, since the KS solution satis￿es
RCAV axiom (but not concavity itself as pointed by Thomson (1994) [21]).
Corollary 1. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the only solution that satis￿es
strong Pareto optimality, midpoint domination, restricted monotonicity and restricted
concavity.
This weighted proportional losses solution belongs to a family of solutions that
are all straight lines on the feasible set starting in the utopia point and ￿nishing on
the cch boundary of the set. The solution outcome is the intersection of this straight
lines with the pareto frontier. We named this family dual reference functions
solutions. Conceptually our dual reference functions solutions are related with
Thomson’s[20] reference functions solutions, that are all straight lines on the feasible
set that start in the disagreement point. Kalai-Smorodinky soltion , is a itself dual
function, since it could be considered as proportional gains from the disagreement
point d as proportional losses from utopia point m(S). The weighted Kalai-
Smorodinky solution introduced by Thomson (1994) [21] is focused in the sense of10 JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
proportional gains from disagreement point, while PL solution is focused in the
sense of proportional concessions from the utopia point, yielding another properties
as strong pareto optimality in R2 and restricted concavity.
All axioms of theorem 1 are tight because none is implied by the others together
and if we do not use one of them, we obtain at least other solution. We have that,
given an  2 n, the only solution that satis￿es strong Pareto optimality, scale
invariance, restricted monotonicity and restricted concavity in R2 is the weighted
Proportional Losses solution.
(1) If we drop strong Pareto optimality, there exist the weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution (KS), introduced by Thomson (1994) [21] , since by the de￿nition
of KS is easy to see that this solution satis￿es the rest of axioms of Theo-
rem 1, since it is a monotonic straight line that connect disagreement point
with a point on the frontier of the set depending of utopia and bargaining
power of each agent, this is the reason for which satis￿es scale invariance,
restricted monotonicity and restricted concavity .
(2) If we drop scale invariance, there exist the equal losses solution, charac-
terized by Chun (1988) [3], and weighted losses solution that also satisfy
strong Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity and restricted concavity for
2 agents problems.
(3) If we drop restricted concavity, we have the asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution (lKS) that was introduced by Dubra (2001) [4] , that is a lexico-
graphic extension of KS solution in order to be strong Pareto optimality,
but renouncing to satisfy continuity axiom that in this context yield a re-
nounce of restricted concavity.
(4) If we drop restricted monotonicity, an utilitarian solution appears de￿ned as





m2 j x 2 S
o
.
Note that this version of utilitarian solution satisfy scale invariance because
the outcome is the tangent point with a straight whose slope is the same
that the e￿cient frontier of the minimum convex comprehensive hull of the
set and also satis￿es restricted concavity. Myerson (1981) [12] proved that
all utilitarian solution satis￿es concavity, this means that for all S;T 2 0,
f(S +(1 )T) = f(S)+(1 )f(T). In words, the solution of a convex
combination of two sets is greater or equal of the convex combination among
the solutions of these sets. In some cases the utilitarian solution yield a
set, in this cases we choose an speci￿c element of it. We take a selection of
this utilitarian solution, lUT(S) = argminfdist(x;PL(S) j x 2 UT(S)g, if
UT(S) is a single point, then lUT(S) = UT(S), it is easy to see that this
solution satis￿es all axioms of theorem 1 except restricted monotonicity.
3. Weighted Proportional Losses for n  3 agents
We also provide a characterization of PL solution for n  3 agents given an





i=1 i = 1
	
. We drop scale invariance, replace strong
Pareto optimality by the weak version, weak Pareto optimality, we also add another




k1  0, such that dist(Sk;m(S)) ! 0 in
the Hausdor￿ topology, then dist(f(Sk);m(S))!0.
Utopia continuity is an axiom which meaning is that if a sequence of sets tend to
the utopia point (free con￿ict point), the solutions of each set it should also tend to
the utopia point.WEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL LOSSES SOLUTION 11
With these modi￿cations we have that:
Theorem 2. For n  3, a solution satis￿es weak Pareto optimality, restricted
monotonicity, utopia continuity, and restricted concavity, axioms if and only if is a
weighted proportional loses solution.
Proof. Let  2 n 1, the proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1. Weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, and utopia
continuity: By the de￿nition of PL are satis￿ed.
 Restricted concavity: Suppose by contradiction that PL(S)+(1 )PL(T) 2
(S + (1   )T) and PL(S + (1   )T) 2 (S + (1   )T;) . By restricted con-
cavity, PL(S + (1   )T) = PL(S) + (1   )PL(T). Suppose PL(S +
(1   )T) < PL(S) + (1   )PL(T). By de￿nition of PL, there is no y 2 S
such that y > x. Then, if PL(S) + (1   )PL(T) 2 (S + (1   )T), no have
PL(S + (1   )T)  PL(S) + (1   )PL(T).










s;t 2 [1;n] and cch(Vt) = cch(Vs). By restricted concavity f(cch(Vt)+(1 )Vt) =
f(cch(Vt)+(1 )f(Vt). By de￿nition of (cch(Vt)+(1 )Vt), f() = f. Suppose
this line do not cross utopia point, then there is a point  x 5 m(S) in this line such
that for some j, xj = mj. Also there is a (Vk) such that f(Vk) =  x. Let p > k, by
restricted monotonicity, f(Vp = f(Vk). If f(Vp = f(Vk), this is a contradiction with
utopia continuity. Then if for i 6= j, fi(Vp > f(Vk) this is also a contradiction with
restricted concavity.

All axioms of theorem 2 are not implied by the others together and if we do not
use one of them, we obtain at least other solution. We have that, given an  2 n 1,
the only solution that satis￿es weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, re-
stricted concavity and utopia concavity in Rn is the weighted proportional losses
solution.
(1) Given an  2 n 1, if we drop weak Pareto optimality, there exist at least
another solution that satis￿es restricted monotonicity, restricted concavity
and utopia continuity, this solution is the non-e￿cient PL and this solutions
yield the same outcome that proportional losses solution less an  2 Rn such
that NePL(S)  PL(S).
(2) If we drop restricted concavity, we obtain the asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution (lKS) that is a lexicographic extension of KS introduced by
Dubra (2001) [4].
(3) If we drop restricted monotonicity, we have the same utilitarian solution that
we use in the independence of axioms for R2.
(4) If we drop utopia continuity, we have the weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion (KS) introduced by Thomson (1994) [21].
In the ￿gure 3 are represented several solutions for a n-person bargaining problem
and we can see several interesting things, the ￿rst one is that PL is a solution
based in losses that has not rationality problems for n-person bargaining problems
as happen with EL solution that could not intersect the bargaining set, instead
PL solution is the convex combination between a endogenous reference point on the
smallest convex comprehensive hull, that in the ￿gure 3 is the triangular surface, with12 JAUME GARC˝A SEGARRA ￿, MIGUEL GIN￿S VILAR
the utopia point. This is the reason why PL will always intersect the bargaining
set for n-person bargaining problem.
We can also see that if we have and expansion of the feasible set maintaining the
same utopia point, and the new frontier of the set it is very close to the utopia point,
KS and other solutions as proportional solution (asymmetric egalitarian, Kalai
19877[?]) E can not satis￿es utopia continuity axiom, is for this reason that if the
frontier of the set tend to the utopia point their solutions for these sets do not tend
to the utopia point.








Figure 3. Solutions for 3 agents bargaining problem
4. Conclusions
It is interesting to observe that PL solution depends both on disagreement point
and on the balance of the power among the agents (), and in addition to this
features, it also depends on the utopia point, since this solution is a mutual concession
from the free con￿ict point in relative terms. In our opinion both disagreement
point dependence and bargaining power dependence are features that should be take
in account in a bargaining context, because is straightforward to think that if one
agent has a worse disagreement point, the rest of the agents could push it to take
advantage from this situation; on the other hand, if one agent has more bargaining
power, he could obtain a better outcome.
Although geometrically the Gupta and Livne [6] solution looks very similar to
PL, conceptually they are very di￿erent, not only because Gupta and Livne useWEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL LOSSES SOLUTION 13
an exogenous reference point but also because Gupta and Livne solution does not
take in account di￿erences in the disagreement point, however, PL solution takes
in account the disagreement point to ￿x the endogenous reference point.
In our opinion, individual monotonicity is an essential axiom that should satisfy a
solution in a context of bargaining (when the agents should reach an agreement). We
have showed that PL satis￿es desirable properties as strong Pareto optimality in
R2 and continuity that are also satis￿ed by Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, but are not
satis￿ed either by the others versions of weighted or asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. Furthermore, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is a itself dual function, yielding
the same properties if we focus on disagreement or utopia point, this implies that, as
well as PL solution, KS could considered as mutual concessions among the agents
starting on the utopia point in the case that all agents have the same bargaining
power (a particular case of PL when  = 1   ). We propose and characterize
the weighted proportional losses solution using a straightforward transformation of
Concavity axiom that is a weaker condition than usual version. This weighted pro-
portional losses solution is a dual version of weighted Kalai -Smorodinsky solution
proposed by Thomson (1994) [21] and can resolve the problem of not Pareto opti-
mality in R2 maintaining restricted set concavity property, that it is also satis￿ed by
KS solution. In this sense, the asymmetric KS solution ( lKS) proposed by Dubra
(2001) [4] can yield an strong Pareto optimal in R2, but renouncing to restricted
concavity property. Hence that PL should be implemented by the agents when
they want individual monotonic solutions and they are bargaining under restricted
probabilistic uncertainty. As the literature point, does not exist any solution that
can satisfy strong Pareto optimality, monotonicity and set concavity for 2-person
bargaining problem but our solution is the only that satis￿es strong Pareto op-
timality, restricted monotonicity and restricted concavity and scale invariance for
2-person bargaining problem.
We also characterize PL solution for n  3 agents, replacing strong Pareto
optimality axiom by weak Pareto optimality version and adding an axiom that we
named utopia continuity, yielding a losses solution that has not rationality problems,
as it is the case of the equal losses or weighted losses solution. Utopia continuity
means that if a sequence of sets tend to utopia point, the solution it should also
tend to this free con￿ict point, since to achieve it is desirable for all agents. Hence,
before to know the set, the agents will prefer that the solution will be as near to the
utopia point as be possible. The motivation of this axiom is that if the utopia point
is a desirable solution for all agents, we have certainty that if the utopia point is
attainable, the agents will reach an agreement. In this line, we hypothesize that the
willingness to reach an agreement of each agent will be higher the closer the solution
is to her ideal payo￿ (her utopia point coordinate). When more agents achieve a
payo￿ close to their ideal payo￿, more likely be an agreement among the agents.
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